turn has prompted the federal government to reduce intergovernmental transfers thus placing stress on state and municipal budgets.
Australia is a federation comprising six independent states (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia) and two Commonwealthcontrolled territories (the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory). There have been two failed attempts to have local government recognised in the federal constitution. As a result, local government remains a 'creature of statute' exercising a limited remit of services according to the delegated powers of the six states and one territory which regulate municipal entities (the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) -which is the seat of the Australian federal parliament -does not have a system of local government; Twomey, 2012) . Historically, local government in Australia has been responsible for roads, rates (local government taxes based on property value) and rubbish. In more recent times the local government remit has been expanded to include addressing market failure (for instance, in providing aged care, childcare and medical services in rural locations), recreation services and development planning, as well as limited welfare and law and order functions. Most of the expanded remit has gone unfunded by higher tiers of government (Dollery, Grant and Crase, 2011) . State government is responsible for operating inter alia schools, police and fire fighting and providing most of the rail infrastructure. The Commonwealth Government is responsible for public goods such as defence, tertiary education and social security (Drew and Dollery, 2015a) . In common with most federalist systems, Australia is characterised by a high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance, with the Commonwealth collecting 81% of tax revenues, compared with just 3.4% attributed to local government (ABS, 2014) . Intergovernmental grants are therefore an important source of income for Australian municipalities.
This chapter differs from others in this book by placing particular emphasis on the effect of regulatory constraints on municipal resilience. The polar approaches of regulators in Australia's two largest jurisdictions -New South Wales (NSW) which regulates 152 municipalities covering a third of the nation's population and Victoria, which regulates 79 municipalities encompassing a quarter of the nation's population -present the ideal institution milieu for such an investigation. For instance, Victorian local government is subject to central auditing (including a thorough system of performance monitoring and performance analysis), has narrowly defined roles for elected representatives (by legislation), was subject to an almost two-thirds reduction in the number of councils in 1994 and has no extant taxation limitations. By way of contrast NSW currently has no system of central auditing (and has only recently introduced an (inadequate) system of performance monitoring), has widely defined roles for elected representatives, is presently in the throes of a forced amalgamation program and has had a system of taxation limitations since 1977. In general, it is probably fair to say that (with the exception of taxation limitations) the Victorian local governments have been subject to heavier regulation and intervention than their NSW peers. This is neither good nor bad, just different -the focus of this paper is to determine whether the different approaches (particularly taxation limitations) manifest as different budget outcomes over the period of study. To facilitate our investigation of the effect of regulatory constraints on municipal resilience we draw on two case studies from each of the jurisdictions. One council from each jurisdiction has been selected from two polar budgetary positions -councils with low volatility negative budget outcomes and councils with highly volatile positive budgetary positions -to expediently highlight the importance of regulatory constraint on municipal resilience.
Section 2 describes the context and, in particular, the features of the two jurisdictions. Section 
Context
Local government in Australia has a more limited remit than many of the other countries discussed in other chapters, focussing on providing roads, rubbish removal, development planning and health inspections, and maintaining parks and recreation facilities. In rural areas there is often a demand for local government to provide important services which may not be commercially viable -such as aged care, home and community care, child care and infrastructure to attract and retain medical practitioners. In contrast, metropolitan municipalities often play a complementary role in welfare (for instance, setting up homeless shelters or 'safe' drug injecting sites) and security (for example, setting up a system of video surveillance in entertainment precincts). Road maintenance is the single largest item of municipal expenditure -accounting for approximately a quarter of local government budgets (PwC, 2006) . It should be noted that Australian municipalities are responsible for over 80% of the national road infrastructure (Chakrabarti, Kodikara and Pardo, 2002) . 
Victorian Local Government
The Victorian local government sector comprises 79 municipalities and had an average population size of 71,245 in 2013 (minimum 3,099, maximum 267,892) . Thus, Victoria has fewer and larger (on average) local government entities than NSW. Length of municipal roads maintained by individual municipalities ranged from 42 km to 11,234 km, with a state mean of 1,659 km. In terms of fiscal responsibilities, the average expenditure in 2014 was A$91m (minimum A$9.55m, maximum A$364m). Victorian municipalities obtain about 63% of their revenues from taxes and fees. Taxes are calculated on the capital improved value of land and structures and the rate of taxation is currently determined by elected representatives of the municipalities (Drew and Dollery, 2015d (use of the entire cohort in a single cluster analysis is important as it allows for a comparison of relative volatility between the two jurisdictions). Cluster analysis is an empirical strategy for arranging municipalities into homogenous groups. Ward's method joins municipalities to groups which result in the minimum increase to the error sum of squares as measured by
Euclidian distance (for further information on cluster analysis see Drew and Dollery, 2014) .
We grouped the analysis into three clusters representing relatively low, medium and high volatilities. A budgetary position and volatility matrix was then constructed over the six financial years (see Table1) . Notably, the majority of municipalities experiencing a mean negative budgetary position over the six years were located in NSW (27 out of the 28 'negative' municipalities). It is also clear that the level of budget volatility was far higher for NSW municipalities than for their
Victorian peers (19 of the 25 high-volatility municipalities were domiciled in NSW).
These results seem to suggest that differences in regulatory approaches might have an important effect on municipal resilience. In order to investigate this matter further we plotted the mean normalised budget position and standard deviation for each jurisdiction to examine inter-temporal trends. We then conducted four case studies drawn from diametrically opposed 
Results
To provide a comprehensive understanding of the effect of regulatory constraint on municipal resilience in the post GFC period we considered the matter from two complimentary perspectives. First, we conducted an inter-temporal comparison in order to establish whether there were in fact clear differences between the two jurisdictions and therefore provide an empirical basis for suggesting that the disparate regulatory environments might have a bearing on the budgetary positions of councils. We then conducted a close examination of four councils in order to understand how regulatory settings, in particular, influence municipal resilience. Notably, the NSW jurisdiction had higher rates of volatility over the entire domain. This is likely the result of the strict tax limitation regime which made it very difficult for municipalities to mitigate volatile expenditure demands with own-source revenue increases.
Inter-temporal Analysis of Jurisdiction Level Responses Post GFC
The NSW jurisdiction also had lower average normalised budget positions for four of the six financial periods. Given that the remaining two periods were characterised by significant shocks to which only Victorian municipalities were exposed, this overall result may be taken to suggest that regulatory settings (in particular tax limitations and investment guidelines) are extremely important to municipal resilience.
The responses of individual municipalities to the various budget disruptions over the 
Individual Council Responses to Shocks
Central Darling Shire in NSW (exhibiting a six-year average budgetary position of -2.22%) has had the most spectacular outcome arising from post-GFC budget disruptions, having been placed into financial Administration in December 2013 when it became clear that the municipality was no longer solvent. This period of Administration has since been extended to 2020 following a public inquiry which identified a long history of failed regulatory interventions stretching back to January 2011 (Colley, 2014) . It is the first instance of government financial failure in Australia.
Elected representatives (councillors) were quick to cite inadequate levels of intergovernmental grants as the cause behind the liquidity crisis confronting the municipality (Drew and Campbell, 2016) . It was argued by councillors that the high infrastructure burden coupled with a small population spread over a vast distance equivalent to one-fifth of the size of the United Kingdom meant that only increased intergovernmental grant transfers could ensure a sustainable municipality. In addition, councillors drew attention to the burden created by an increasing obligation of municipal government to address market failure (such as the purchase and operation of the Wilcannia Post Office after the previous owners fell into receivership) (Drew and Campbell, 2016 (Colley, 2014, p. 9) . The attitude of the council might indeed have been the result of an extreme sense of fatalism as concluded by the Commissioner. However, it is also a possibility that the events leading up to the Administration period may have been the result of brinkmanship. Rather than reducing services, councillors expanded some services and when it became apparent that the council was approaching insolvency wrote to their Member of Parliament demanding an immediate cash injection of $2 million and a review of the quantum of grant transfers to the Shire (Colley, 2014, pp. 28-31) . The state government response seems to have taken the council by surprise: the shire did not get a cash injection and was forced into administration, however, it did receive an increase in its FAG allocations in the order of $800,000 per annum from 2012/13 levels (Drew and Campbell, 2016) . In any event, the conclusion of the public inquiry was that the liquidity crisis could only be addressed through deep and enduring cuts to municipal services. Moreover, the Commissioner determined that the current elected representatives did not have an adequate commitment to the recovery plan and therefore declared that the municipality would need to continue in Administration for a further six years (Colley, 2014) .
A number of interesting observations can be made regarding the municipal resilience of Central Darling Shire. In the first instance, it is clear that tax limitations imposed by regulatory authorities exerted a direct influence on the coping capacity of elected representatives, essentially dictating a high level of dependency on intergovernmental grant transfers for revenue side approaches to resolving the liquidity problem. Second, the transcripts from the public inquiry suggest that a combination of municipal tax limitations along with a high level of grant transfers had resulted in a disconnect between resident demand for enhanced services and own-source revenue (Colley, 2014) . Finally, it is clear that elected representatives of the municipality suffered from diminished anticipatory capacity: it appears from the transcripts of the inquiry that the councillors really did believe that the state government would bail the municipality out of the liquidity crisis. Moreover, councillors seemed unable to anticipate the outcome of the inquiry: following the release of the Commissioner's recommendations the Mayor was cited as saying that he 'was shocked to hear the suspension will stay' and that the 'councillors were ready to return to work, and even had plans underway for the Administrator to hand back control' (Local Government Career, 2014).
In Victoria there was just one council with a negative budgetary position over the six financial years subsequent to the GFC -Monash (six-year average budgetary position of -1.66%). In its submission to the Essential Services Commission (ESC) regarding the proposed tax limitation framework, the municipality boasted that it 'has consistently kept rates as low as possible and has the lowest rates of all 79 Victorian municipalities' and that it 'has proudly maintained the lowest rating status for several years' (Monash City Council, 2015) . In one sense Monash Council appears to have a self-imposed tax limitation regime which has led to similar results to those experienced by some NSW municipalitiesdeteriorating budgetary positions over an extended period of time. However, unlike Central Darling, Monash Council was able to anticipate a looming crisis and was prepared and able to take actions on the expenditure side to mitigate poor budgetary outcomes. In January 2014,
Monash Council voted to sell its two aged-care facilities (housing 165 residents) to Royal
Freemasons for A$21.8m. This sale was expected to save the council approximately A$1m
per annum in subsidies for the facilities as well 'several millions of dollars in capital works in the short term' (Lake, 2015) . It is important to note one very big difference between the two municipalities -Central Darling is a rural council situated 950 km west of Sydney, whilst
Monash is a metropolitan council located just 25.8 km from Melbourne, the Victorian capital.
Consequently, Monash had the advantage of being able to find commercial operators which could make a profit operating council assets, whereas Central Darling had only the option of closing facilities -the shire's remote location makes many commercial operations simply not viable. Therefore, it is clear that Monash had significantly greater coping capacity by virtue of its geographical position, but also greater anticipatory awareness of the need to adapt and mitigate revenue side budgetary constraints. between the two NSW municipalities was on the revenue that each was able to extract by virtue of the tax limitation measures. Tax limitations were based on incremental increases on the extant tax rate charged in 1977 -therefore municipalities which had small differences in rate revenue in 1977 could conceivably end up with large differences owing to the compounding effect of almost four decades (Abelson and Joyeux, 2015) . Thus, as at 2012
Carrathool was collecting well over four times the municipal taxes as was Central Darling
Shire despite roughly comparable capacity of residents to pay (Office of Local Government, 2015) . It should be noted that municipalities have the option to apply for special rate variations (SRV) to increase municipal taxes above regulated annual increase levels.
However, this process is expensive (owing to the regulatory requirements to demonstrate need and community support) and politically charged, and one to which few municipalities are prepared to commit (in 2012 just 13 municipalities applied for SRVs) (IPART, 2015) . In (IPART, 2015) . This comparison highlights the importance of municipal tax flexibility in allowing municipalities to respond to shocks and thus produce positive budget outcomes.
Indeed, the Mayor of Loddon Shire has recognised that the introduction of similar tax limitations in Victoria would impose severe constraints on the municipal budget, noting that 'we are going to have to start a conversation with our community around what services we might be able to reduce' (ABC, 2015b). Thus, Loddon Shire is exhibiting great anticipatory awareness regarding the effect of regulatory constraints on municipal resilience. However, the Mayor asserts that the plan will ultimately result in unsustainable municipalities because 'our residents do not want a cutback in Council services' (ABC, 2015b). Thus, whilst the past behaviour of Loddon Shire might best be described as adaptive it appears that looming regulatory constraints are creating an atmosphere of fatalism.
Conclusion
Australia has been widely lauded as one of the few developed economies to have escaped recession subsequent to the GFC. However, some of the measures taken by the Commonwealth to provide fiscal stimulus in the wake of the economic shock appear to have resulted in significant budget disruption for municipalities. Moreover, local governments have been exposed to a number of other shocks arising from natural disasters, loss of investment principal associated with 'risky' financial products and extraordinary defined benefits superannuation calls.
The financial resilience of individual municipalities seems to have been influenced, at least in part, by jurisdiction level constraints -in particular, investment guidelines and tax limitations. NSW municipalities were exposed to significant risk as a result of inadequate investment guidelines (at the state regulator level) and they produced highly volatile budget outcomes as a consequence of revenue constraints associated with the tax limitations. In It might be noted that the absence of self-regulatory approaches to resilience, evident in our sample, may be due to the sampling approach used in this chapter: we specifically, sought out examples of extreme outcomes to highlight the effect of regulatory constraint which we argued are most likely to be first perceived at the margins. It is entirely possible that local governments in the better represented cells of the budgetary position matrix exhibited other resilience behaviours such as self-regulation. However, our approach has uncovered tentative evidence of a novel resilience behaviour -brinkmanship (Central Darling Shire). In nations such as Australia where an important source of revenue is provided by a system of intergovernmental transfers not governed by robust empirical methodology, there is an incentive for local governments to try to exploit these so-called soft budget constraints (Oates, 2005) . As fiscal austerity starts to bight (in combination with exacerbating factors such as taxation limitations) it is entirely possible that we will soon observe new instances of municipalities failing to cut services despite falling revenues in the hope that they might receive a bailout (either directly or through changes to grant transfers) should the finances deteriorate to crisis point.
Ironically, the Victorian Government is set to introduce a tax limitation regime which will largely bring to an end the revenue flexibility which allowed Victorian municipalities to produce superior budget outcomes over the post-GFC period. Meanwhile, the NSW Government is in the throes of a forced municipal amalgamation program, largely designed to arrest the decline of local government budget positions -a decline attributable in large part to the longstanding tax limitation regime (Abelson and Joyeux, 2015) .
In summary, this chapter has demonstrated that regulatory policy can exert a large influence on municipal budgetary position and volatility. In particular, tax limitations and lax investment guidelines can seriously diminish resilience. However, it is also true that representatives' understandings of financial vulnerability and the willingness to exercise spending restraint can have important implications for individual municipalities, notwithstanding the aforementioned constraints. In addition, we have demonstrated the importance of geographical context on municipal resilience. Specifically, low population size, low population density and large distance from major conurbations provides both little opportunity to outsource service provision as well as high demand on local government to address market failure. Finally, our analysis suggests bleak futures for municipalities within the two jurisdictions as the first signs of fiscal austerity start to emerge through the three-year freeze to intergovernmental grants. In particular, the imminent introduction of tax limitations to Victoria is a matter of great concern. Moreover, the NSW regulatory authorities seem unwilling to confront the problems caused by the longstanding tax limitation regime and instead have embarked on a disruptive program of forced amalgamation.
